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Sharia law in UK ‘unavoidable’: archbishop – SMH – 08 Feb.08

Posted on February 8, 2008 by kf1

The archbishop of Canterbury has called for a limited application of Islamic law in Britain – winning immediate praise from British Muslims.

The unusual proposal from Britain’s highest ranking Christian leader would, if adopted, allow British Muslims to choose to resolve marital and financial disputes under Sharia, or Islamic law, rather than through British courts.

Archbishop Rowan Williams said in a radio interview with BBC radio that incorporating Islamic law could help improve Britain’s flagging social cohesion.

Williams said making such a move seemed “unavoidable”.

“Certain provisions of Sharia are already recognised in our society and under our law, so it’s not as if we’re bringing in an alien and rival system,” said Williams, who gave a speech on the topic tonight.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s spokesman immediately rejected Williams’ proposal.

“The prime minister believes British law should apply in this country, based on British values,” spokesman Michael Ellam said.

The idea was also rejected by Sayeed Warsi, the shadow minister for Community Cohesion and Social Action. She said all British citizens had to be subject to the same laws developed by Parliament.

Williams said he was not advocating that Britain allow some of the more extreme aspects of Sharia, which has been associated with harsh punishments meted out by Islamic courts in Saudi Arabia and some other countries and also has been used to undermine the rights of women.

“Nobody in their right mind” would want to see that, he said, calling for “a clear eye” when discussing Islamic law.

Mohammed Shafiq, director of the Ramadhan Foundation, said the use of Sharia would help lower tensions in British society.

“It would make Muslims more proud of being British,” he said. “It would give Muslims the sense that the British respect our faith.”

Shafiq said it was important that non-Muslims in Britain understand that Williams is not suggesting Sharia be adopted for resolving criminal charges, but only civil disputes.

This sort of conflict resolution is common in Muslim countries and is also used in some parts of Canada, he said.

Both Shafiq and Williams noted that Britain already allows Orthodox Jews to resolve disputes under traditional Jewish law.

Rodney Barker, a political science professor at the London School of Economics, said Williams’ decision to address such a controversial issue was not surprising.

“He’s not a cautious, conservative priest,” Barker said. “He recognises we live in a society where there is not one dominant religion. He doesn’t say, ‘I have the truth and the rest of you are wicked and deluded.”‘

But there are dangers involved in letting one community apply one type of justice while another uses a different system, said Fawaz Gerges, a professor of Middle East studies at Sarah Lawrence College in Bronxville, New York, who has written extensively about militant Islam.

“It’s a minefield,” he said. “Where do you stop? Where do you set the limit? Britain is a nation of laws, once you say to a community that they can apply their own laws, you are establishing a dangerous precedent.”

He said the image of Sharia in the West has been badly distorted by the way it has been used by militants as justification for their goal of removing secular governments and establishing Islamic governments.

“Unfortunately in the last 10 years the dominant narrative has been one of militancy,” he said. “But I don’t think you’ll find a single Muslim, except for secular ones, who does not believe that the Sharia is sacred and that it encompasses all aspects of life.”

He said it would be impossible to apply all aspects of Sharia in a country like Britain.

“It is extremely complex,” Gerges said. “There is great disagreement among Muslim scholars about these laws that have come down in the last 1,400 years. But from a Muslim point of view, the application of some Sharia law is very desirable.”

Source

UK sharia row deepens – SMH – 10 Feb.2008

Transcript

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Israel to demolish Mosque because there is no building permit (Could that be because the Mosque was built 700 years ago)

Posted on February 6, 2008 by kf1

Mufti condemns Israeli decision to demolish historic mosque near Jerusalem

Jerusalem – Ma’an – The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein has condemned a decision by Israeli authorities to demolish the Al-Omari mosque in the village of Umm Tuba near Jerusalem under the pretext that the building had been built without a license on Sunday.

Sheikh Hussein told Ma’an that the mosque was built more than 700 years go, and it was last restored in 1963. It is the only mosque in Umm Tuba.

The Mufti claimed that Israeli authorities have been attempting to wipe out historic Islamic sites in Palestine which is violation of all religious values and international treaties.

He warned of the repercussions and called on the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which is charged with protecting human cultural heritage around the world, and other international organizations to prevent the demolition of the mosque.

Source

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Pakistan – May 1953 – Atlantic Monthly

Posted on February 4, 2008 by kf1

Quaid E Azam

The least understood great power of Asia today is probably Pakistan. To Western eyes, Pakistan is that “other India,” the vestige that was left over when India achieved her independence. A Pakistani is always being taken for an Indian, simply because he is a citizen of the same subcontinent. He feels something like an Israeli being taken for an Arab because both are Semites.

Pakistan would be easier to understand at a distance if it were one remnant. But it is made up of two unequal lobes separated by the vast territory of India – hung like two great ears of an elephant, two Muslim ears on an Indian skull.

West Pakistan, the left-hand ear, has some 33 million people, including energetic mountaineers and light-skinned members of the ancient Aryan races. East Pakistan, separated from the other ear by a thousand miles of Indian brow, has a darker, tamer race of rice and jute growers and there are some 42 million of them. In their swampy forest they are packed 800 to the square mile, while in the parched western plains there are hardly 110 people to a square mile.

The plan for a split Muslim nation, sketched by the father of Pakistan, the lean, aristocratic reed of fire called Mohammed Au Jinnah, drew little encouragement from Lord Louis Mounthatten, Nehru, and Gandhi, fellow artisans of the division.

Nehru had predicted earlier that a Muslim state carved out of India would collapse. In 1936 he had written: “Politically the idea is absurd, economically it is fantastic . . . . And even if many people believed in it, it would still vanish at the touch of reality.”

Few people in the West, at first, wished Pakistan well. Pakistan, a new “Islamic Democracy” the Muslim religion as the foundation for its existence, did not seem to be a blessed move toward oneness of the world. The terrible mutual slaughters that accompanied the exchange of population when Pakistan and India separated caused observers to ask why so much blood was necessary, and to blame it on Pakistan. The contrast seemed the more striking because 43 million Muslims remained in “Bharat,” as the Pakistanis call India, not going over to Pakistan at all.

West and East Pakistan, even amid so much pessimism, stoutly refused to make the worst come true. When Jinnah died his spirit was carried on by the cool international lawyer Zafrullah Klan, and by the able, thoroughly modern premier, Liaquat Ali Khan and his Begum, who bore with grace and good humor a Western opinion that often confused them with Rita Ilayworth and Aly Khan. A fanatic Afghan emptied a revolver into Liaquat Ali in the old Kipling town of Rawalpindi; still Pakistan did not waste away, but found fresh hope in new Prime Minister, the roly-poly little politician Khawaja Nazimuddin.

Kashmir, Asian Trieste

When Greece and Turkey exchanged populations a few years ago, they passed from being enemies to being allies of sorts. Pakistan and India are such a natural partnership, too, but the reconciliation has never taken place. What prevents it is the question of Kashmir, the mountain state wedged into the Western Himalayas.

Kashmir is partly Hindu, partly Tibetan Buddhist, but mostly Muslim. Yet India holds most of it. Irregulars from Pakistan’s Khyber Pass country, riding in trucks with homemade rifles over their shoulders, attempted to take the lovely lakeland of Kashmir for their own, to “liberate” it, not without some looting. Nehru snapped in paratroopers and followed them with Indian army regulars. He still holds the country, stalling off the endless demands by both the UN and Pakistan for a plebiscite.

The Pakistanis managed to save for themselves less than half of Kashmir and about a quarter of the population. They block the main exit road and compel the Kashmir government of Sheikh Abdullah to wear out its trucks on the 9000-foot Banihal Pass, closed by snow in winter.

Pakistan, with its vast fields of wheat and cotton, and with its anti-Communist barrier range of healthy little Himalayan states like Swat and Ilunza, ought to be a happier and wealthier country than it is. The two Pakistans, East and West, share the advantage of all farming, nonindustrial countries in our day. But Kashmir prevents them from enjoying these fruits. Even when drought cuts down the yellow wheat of the Punjab, forcing Pakistan to buy bread, the trouble starts—the Pakistanis feel—with Kashmir.

Kashmir lies heavy on the Pakistani brow heavier than Trieste on the Italian. The Pakistanis know that just an auto ride away are thousands of co-Muslims who would go to Pakistan if they had a free choice. What prevents the Pakistanis from rescuing their Kashmir brothers-in-faith is the presence of a well-behaved Indian army. New Delhi’s position in this matter is that India is responsible for the maintenance of order in Kashmir.

Rice for coal

East Pakistan has worked out a fair deal with India by shipping its jute to the hungry factories in Bengal. The rice of East Pakistan—rice being the best bargaining lever in the East today—keeps East Pakistan financially independent. And the Pakistanis, who are providers of raw cotton for the mills of Red China, agreed in March to provide 10,000 tons more in return for 100,000 tons of Chinese coal.

But the narrow corridor of West Pakistan, squeezed between a hostile Afghanistan and an unfriendly India, strung on its cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar, is too tense to be healthy. How long would it take India’s tanks to stab westward through the Punjab to the Northwest Frontier, severing West Pakistan like a broken hourglass? This is the question every Pakistani asks himself.

Karachi, the seaport capital on the broiling Arabian Sea, has become an Asiatic Los Angeles a bursting boom town, living on a miracle of will. Its terrible slums, a vast Hooverville of ragged doorways, oilcans for water, and rickety children are very slowly being cleared away. But a fundamental fever in West Pakistan remains, though the incredible 6 million refugees are gradually be absorbed.

A Pakistani woman is usually more progressive than any of her Muslim sisters. The veil has been almost wholly whisked away. Clean and intelligent young women, wearing the national white tunic march with rifles over their shoulders ready to defend the nation. But some plain needs remain unsolved—among them, water. What about water?

Source

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Israel ‘planning another Lebanon war’

Posted on February 1, 2008 by kf1

Fuad Siniora

The Lebanese Premier says the Winograd Report on the 2006 war against Lebanon confirms that Israel plans to attack his country again.

In an official statement released by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora on Thursday, he said that the report calls for Israel to prepare for the next war, which shows that it ‘had not learned from its defeat.’

Siniora added the report ‘ignores Israel’s crimes’ against Lebanon.

The Winograd Report on the 33-day war against Lebanon revealed on Wednesday that the war was a failure for the Zionist regime.

Lebanese army Chief, General Michel Suleiman had earlier said the report proved that Israel was the party who started the war without any justification.

Hours after the report’s publication, Hezbollah said that the Winograd Report proved that Israel suffered a humiliating defeat in its military campaign.

SB/RE Source

Summary of the Winograd Commission Report – Also see below| Winograd Commission |

A report on the Israeli 33-day war against Lebanon by the Winograd Committee has revealed major faults on all levels during the war. The long-awaited report blamed the lack of proper leadership and coordination for Israel’s humiliating defeat against Hezbollah.Eliyahu Winograd, chairman of the committee said on Wednesday that “major faults were found on all levels during the war.”The committee said in the final report that it found “severe failures and faults in the decision making process, both in the political echelon and the military echelon.”He said “Israel embarked on a prolonged war that it initiated, which ended without a clear Israeli victory from a military standpoint.”

Winograd added the commission’s decision not to assign personal responsibility to any of those mentioned in its final report does not mean they were exonerated of such responsibility.

He assailed the final, large-scale ground operation, saying it “did not achieve any military objectives nor did it fulfill its potential.”

A Hezbollah Spokesman said on Wednesday that the Winograd report confirmed the Zionist regime suffered a blistering defeat at the hands of Hezbollah, AFP reported.

“The report confirms what Hezbollah was saying all along: Israel failed completely in achieving its goals and the Israeli army suffered a military defeat at the hands of Hezbollah,” spokesman Hussein Rahal said.

SB/RE Source

Summary of the Winograd Commission Report

Thursday, January 31, 2008

Good Evening.

1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.

2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquiry.

3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical review and to painful but required mending.

4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers, including bereaved families.

5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state’s security and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our unclassified Report.

6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives for which the Commission was established to respond to the bad feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.

7. This conception of our role was one of the main reasons for our decision not to include in the Final Report personal conclusions and recommendations. We believe that the primary need for improvements applies to the structural and systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war on all levels.

Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we refrained from imposing personal responsibility does not imply that no such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our statement from the Interim Report: We will not impose different standards of responsibility to the political and the military echelons, or to persons of different ranks within them.

8. Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war. Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war.

9. The purpose of this press release is not to sum up the Final Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The Report itself includes discussions of many important issues, which are an inseparable part of the Report, its conclusions and recommendations.

10. In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the events of the period after the initial decision to go to war, which we had discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of the period covered by the Final Report took place under the shadow of the constraints created by the decision to go to war, with all its failings and flaws.

We want to stress that we stand behind everything we said in the Interim Report, and the two parts of the Report complement each other.

11. Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel’s civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.

12. In the period we examined in the Final Report – from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:

· We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.

· We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.

· We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.

· We found severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.

· These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.

13. The decision made in the night of July 12th to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals – limited Israel’s range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hezbollah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and ‘cleaning’ it of Hezbollah military infrastructure.

14. The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.

15. After the initial decision to use military force, and to the very end of the war, this period of ‘equivocation’ continued, with both the political and the military echelon not deciding between the two options: amplifying the military achievement by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining from such a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This ‘equivocation’ did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long weeks passed without a serious discussion of these options, and without a decision one way or the other between them.

16. In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajectory of the military action, there was a very long delay in the deployment necessary for an extensive ground offensive, which was another factor limiting Israel’s freedom of action and political flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.

17. As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was ‘dragged’ into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.

18. The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.

19. This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF’s readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.

20. All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsibility for this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals determined by the political echelon share responsibility.

21. We should note that, alongside the failures in the IDF performance, there were also important military achievements. Special mention should go to the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war, as well as the many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.

22. The air force should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war. However, there were those in the IDF high command, joined by some in the political echelon, who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities of the air force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the impressive achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, and were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.

23. The “Hannit” episode colored to a large extent the whole performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a critical contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the Northern Command with varied effective support of its fighting.

24. We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of them would not be implemented. This conclusion also does not depend on the intentions or goals of the powers that supported the resolution.

25. We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff work on Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation improved in part when the team headed by the prime minister’s head of staff was established. The team worked efficiently and with dedication, professionalism and coordination. This could not compensate, however, for the absence of preparatory staff work and discussions in the senior political echelon.

26. This fact may have much significance to the way Israel conducts negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrangements reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often made that may have far-reaching implications on Israel’s interests, including the setting of precedents.

27. The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic and efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, it did not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to maintain an effective relationship between military achievements and diplomatic activities.

28. We now turn to the political and military activity concerning the ground operation at the end of the war. This is one of the central foci of public debate.

29. True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.

30. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the evaluation of these decisions should not be made with hindsight. It cannot depend on the achievements or the costs these decisions in fact had. The evaluation must be based only on the reasons for the operation, and its risks and prospects as they were known – or as they should have been known – when it was decided upon. Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground operation at the end of the war without recalling the developments that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adoption of the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the overall conduct of the war.

31. Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:

· The cabinet decision of August 9th to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the MOD to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable – was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.

· The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.

· Both the position of the Prime minister who had preferred to avoid the ground operation and the position of the Minister of Defense who had thought it would have served Israel’s interest to go for it had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns a fact we cannot ascertain – we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel’s interest.

32. We want to stress: The duty to make these difficult decisions was the political leaders’. The sole test of these decisions is public and political.

33. At the same time, we also note that:

· We have not found within either the political or the military echelons a serious consideration of the question whether it was reasonable to expect military achievements in 60 hours that could have contributed meaningfully to any of the goals of the operation;

· We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted;

· We have not seen an explanation of the tension between the great effort to get additional time to conclude the first stage of the planned ground operation and the decisions not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.

34. A description of failures in the conduct of war may be regarded as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our findings to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point out these failures and shortcomings because we are certain that only in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal strengthened. We are pleased that processes of repair have already started. We recommend a deep and systematic continuation of such processes. It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli leaders and public to determine whether, when facing challenges in the future, we will come to them more prepared and ready, and whether we shall cope with them in a more serious and responsible way than the way the decision-makers had acted in the political and the military echelons — in the 2nd Lebanon war.

35. Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems.

36. For these reasons we would like to caution against dangers which might upset plans and delay required change processes, and thus produce dangerous results:

· Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to defensive reactions, working by the book, and abstention from making resolute decisions and preferring non-action. Such behavior is undesirable and also dangerous.

· In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepare better for the last war. It is also essential not to limit oneself to superficial action, designed to create an appearance that flaws had been corrected.

· It is also essential not to focus exclusively on coping with dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenarios with an active seeking of opportunities.

· When speaking on learning, one should take into account that enemies, too, are learning their lessons.

37. The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them – if necessary through the use of military force – from achieving their goal.

38. These truths do not depend on one’s partisan or political views. Israel must – politically and morally – seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.

39. These truths have profound and far-reaching implications for many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its challenges are managed. Beyond examining the way the Lebanon War was planned and conducted; beyond the examination of flaws in decision-making and performance that had been revealed in it – important as they may be; these are the central questions that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that lie at the very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. These are the questions we need to concentrate on.

40. We hope that our findings and conclusions in the Interim and the Final Reports will bring about not only a redress of failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its leaders and thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and develop the appropriate ways to address the challenges and respond to them.

41. We are grateful for the trust put in us when this difficult task was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectification of the failings we have identified – this will be our best reward.

Thank you. – Source

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The Shah of Pakistan?- Musharraf’s Post-Electoral Prospect By AHMAD FARUQUI

Posted on February 1, 2008 by kf1

General Pervez Musharraf

Having orchestrated many an electoral charade during the past eight years to keep himself in power, Musharraf now faces what may be the final test of his political career. The general-turned politician is probably the only man in Pakistani history (and maybe world history) who had himself “re-elected” president by a parliament whose term was expiring and that had elected him once before. He may be similarly unique in having been allowed to hold the dual offices of army chief and president by a special act of parliament.

But his real test is going to be on the 18th of February when Pakistanis are slated to go to the polls to elect the next parliament. There is a small chance that he may postpone the polls on one pretext or the other but it seems increasingly unlikely, now that US Secretary of State Condi Rice has given him a public reminder about the need to hold free and fair elections.

While Musharraf’s name will not be on the ballot box in any constituency on the 18th of February, the outcome of the elections will seal his fate. Three outcomes are possible of which two spell catastrophe for him and one spells a middling type of existence that is very different from the “unity of command” mode that he has gotten used to.

The first outcome is that the elections involve massive rigging, produce a huge win for the political party that supports Musharraf and are rejected by the people. Ever since the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) with which he was working assiduously to strike a deal, has distanced itself from him to the point of pointing an accusatory finger at him over her murder.

The PPP is widely viewed as being the country’s largest party and would not countenance a defeat easily. The party may be able to bring even bigger crowds onto the streets after her death than it was able to do while she was alive. The sympathy factor cannot be underestimated in Pakistani society. If a repetition of the December riots takes place, the army will be compelled to move.

General Kayani, the new army chief, is known to be a quiet man, one about whom not much has been written. For the ex-Spy Master, that is not a surprising quality. But he is also known to be a more thoughtful man than Musharraf.

When Musharraf suspended the Chief Justice in March, Kayani along with several other generals visited the judge to persuade him to resign. While the other generals spoke harshly to the judge, Kayani reportedly did not say much and privately is said to have opposed the demand for the judge’s removal, fearing it was a violation of the Constitution. While Musharraf has heaped praise after praise on him, including conferring the country’s highest award on him, Kayani may not prove to be the loyal student that Musharraf hopes dearly that he will turn out to be.

Faced with riots and further bad publicity for Pakistan on the global stage with all the near-term and long-term consequences that it brings, Kayani could well decide to act in the national interest than in Musharraf’s interest. He could do one of two things. One, he could declare Martial Law, depose Musharraf, and hold fresh elections. The entire nation would be grateful to him and welcome Martial Law provided elections are held and power transferred to the people’s representatives.

Or two, he could take an indirect approach, one that has not yet played out on the political stage in Pakistan. The general could send a behind-the-scenes signal to the current Supreme Court judges to annul Musharraf’s presidential election or restore the previous justices who were removed by Musharraf. Either action would seal Musharraf’s fate. In the second option, Kayani would keep the army out of politics and preserve its professional integrity. It has a higher probability of occurrence because of that reason.

The second outcome of the 18th of February is that the elections turn out to be free and fair and his opponents emerge with an absolute majority. The sentiment in the new parliament will be very strongly anti-Musharraf and it is entirely possible that a bill will be brought to a vote calling for his impeachment from the presidency.

Even Musharraf has admitted that possibility in an interview with the Strait Times of Singapore. When asked what he would do if such an eventuality comes to pass, a clearly rattled Musharraf said he would resign if the passage of the bill was imminent. He said he has been waiting to get back to the golf course and tennis court for quite some time and the resignation would allow him to do that.

What is notable that he has referred to the possibility of resigning several times during the past seven months while having never mentioned it in his first seven years. The dark thought has now entered his mind and will not leave. But this is the first time that he has not invoked the national interest to justify staying in office and not resigning. This is more than a subtle change in diction or tone. It is an embracement of reality. The former general is increasingly sounding like a soldier who has fought his last battle. He is worn out, tired and dejected.

The third outcome on the 18th of February is that the elections are indeed free and fair and widely accepted as being so but unlike the second outcome, they yield a hung parliament where his opponents do not have a majority. This will give him a much needed reprieve. He will probably be able to cobble together a coalition government that would keep him in power for a while longer. But even this outcome will deny him longevity. He is unlikely to stay in power for a full five-year term.

Superficially, Musharraf is not ready to sign his letter of resignation. Witness his recent European sojourn. What are we to make of it? Partly, it is designed to send a signal to the world that he is still in charge, that he has nothing to fear by leaving the country even though he is no longer wearing his beloved second-skin, the army uniform. Partly it is designed to prove to the West that he is still the best bet for keeping the terrorists at bay.

He berated the Europeans for pressing Pakistan on the issue of democracy and human rights, saying it had taken Europe centuries to get there. He reminded them that Pakistan was still a tribal society and needed a strong ruler at the top to keep it from becoming unglued. He talked about having restored freedom of the press and liberated women from decades of subjugation.

But what cannot have been lost on Musharraf is the strongly-worded statement that was issued on the eve of his European journey by a hundred retired flag officers from all three services that called upon him to resign. The former generals, air marshals and admirals spoke with a single voice when they said that he had become an impediment to the restoration of democracy and by using the army to keep him in power, he had brought the armed forced into disrepute. This must have hurt him since it cannot just be reflecting the views of the hundred who signed the letter. Uniformed officers must be talking along those lines in army barracks from Peshawar to Karachi, from Rawalpindi to Quetta, from Kharian to Lahore.

Against the backdrop of all these scenarios and outcomes, Musharraf’s political future is dim, his prospects for political recovery slim. Any other man in his position would take the high road and resign now, without any pre-conditions. He would form a nationally representative government with the sole objective of holding free and fair elections and leave the country. The Hoover Institution at Stanford would be pleased to have him join Donald Rumsfeld and other relics of the Bush Imperium as a fellow.

The longer Musharraf hangs on to power, the weaker are his chances of making a graceful exit. Up to now, the US has stood with him. It won’t forever. All he needs to do is recall the manner in which the US abandoned its long-standing friend, the Shah of Iran, of how the Shah spent his last years in Mexico, stricken with cancer, of how his native land refused to accept his body and of how he came to be buried in a dusty mosque deep in the heart of old Cairo.

Ahmad Faruqui has authored Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, available from Ashgate Publishing. He can be reached at: Faruqui@pacbell.net

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India – April 1946 – Atlantic Monthly

Posted on January 29, 2008 by kf1

India

“India,” said Jawaharlal Nehru recently, “is on the brink of a mighty revolution.” The mutiny and rioting in Bombay haye underscored his warning. The showdown is coming.

From January 7 to April 12, 1946, the Indian provinces are voting in the last elections to be held under the Constitution of 1935. When the results are known, the lower houses of the Provincial Legislatures will elect from their members a constitution-making body to frame the Constitution of Independent India. India will then take her place on an equal footing with the other self-governing Dominions of the Empire. That is Britain’s offer. It all sounds so simple. Then why the revolution?

The most powerful figure in Indian politics today is not the Viceroy, nor Mahatma Gandhi, nor Jawaharlal Nehru. It is a lean, gray-haired, impeccably dressed Karachi lawyer, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the All-India Moslem League. Upon his attitude depends the success or failure of the present attempt to solve the Indian problem.

Ten or twelve years ago, Jinnah was an obscure but wealthy lawyer. He is a former member of the All-India Congress, which he now vehemently attacks. By astute political maneuvering, he has made himself the leader of a political party which commands the support of the majority of Indian Moslems, and can block any move by the British government to confer self-government on India.

Britain has often been taunted with employing “divide and rule” tactics in India, but the cleverest attempt at dividing and ruling is that of Jinnah. Moslems number only 94.5 millions according to the census of 1941. Compared with the 255 million Hindus, they will always be in a minority in any system of democratically elected bodies.

To counter this disability the Moslems, as long ago as 1909, pressed for and secured the electoral device of separate Hindu and Moslem electorates, with seats “reserved” in the legislature on a communal basis. This procedure ensured to Moslems a political representation in excess of their numerical proportions. But it did not satisfy them for long.

When Congress ministries took office in seven out of eleven provinces in 1937, Moslem Leaguers (who had polled only 4.6 per cent of the total Moslem vote) were denied any share in the spoils of office. Moslem League propagandists have represented this situation as a denial of their legitimate rights, and as proof of a Hindu determination to dominate India. Tactically, it may have been unwise of Congress, but under a party system of government it is difficult to see how it could have done otherwise. Congress did not refuse office to Moslems as such, but to Moslems who were not members of Congress.

For Congress is not, as League followers claim, a Hindu organization. The Hindu Mahasabha is the party of orthodox Hindus. Congress is, and always has been, open to Moslems, and has a notable Moslem president, the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Mr. Asaf Ali is another Moslem member of the Working Committee. To expect Congress to present ministerial offices to its political rivals is as if the British Labor Party, after its recent overwhelming victory, should be invited to give Cabinet posts to members of the insignificant Independent Labor Party, which had opposed it at the polls.

How many nations in India?

The experience of one election convinced Jinnah that his party could never hope to enjoy a ruling majority. In 1940 he accordingly resurrected the theory of Pakistan, claiming that Hindus and Moslems are two separate nations.

Before 1940 no one outside the Moslems, and few among them, took Pakistan seriously, but by persistent advocation in season and out, Jinnah has made of it the central issue before India today. He has made of the League a real political party, and in the recent elections to the Central Legislative Assembly it won all the Mohammedan seats (30), polling 86.6 per cent of the total Moslem votes. These elections were based on the extremely restricted franchise of the 1919 Act, and the total number of votes cast was only 586,647, representing almost exclusively the propertied classes.

In the provincial elections now taking place, with an electorate of over 30 millions, the League is unlikely to repeat its 100 per cent success, but there is little doubt that it will gain a decisive majority of Moslem votes for a policy of Pakistan.

The real problem starts from this point the League is pledged not to make the new Constitution work unless it starts from the basic assumption of Pakistan. There must be not one but two constitution-making bodies, says Jinnah -one for Hindustan and one for Pakistan. Hindus naturally are not willing to submit, in advance of the elections, to the dictation of a minority.

Allegations of corrupt practices and official interference have been made by the League and Congress in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. Doubtless many are true. The greatest curse of Indian political and administrative life is corruption running like a putrefying streak from top to bottom. Election returns from the North-West Frontier Province show, however, that the majority of Moslems in their traditional home are opposed to the vivisection of India.

Jinnah wrecked the Simla Conference – called by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell -in July, 1945. He can wreck the elections. All he has to do is to stall, and the longer he stalls, the stronger he grows.

The British government, which most Indians are now convinced is genuinely anxious to hand over power, is thus faced with a quandary. Britain’s offer of August, 1940, guaranteed minorities against forcible inclusion in any future Indian Union or Federation; the undertaking was reiterated in the Cripps offer of March-April, 1942, and at the Simla Conference.

Jinnah asks the British government to guarantee his Pakistan scheme; he does not ask the people of India, and is quite oblivious to the 30 millions who would be a Hindu minority in the six provinces which he claims: Sind, Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam. Of these, only the first three have a decisively Moslem population. In the Punjab, Moslems number 57

per cent; in Bengal 54 per cent; while in Assam they are actually in a minority. Even under this plan, about one fifth of the Indian Moslems would remain outside Pakistan.

Theory versus fact

Nevertheless Jinnah insists on acceptance of the present boundaries of those provinces for the hypothetical state of Pakistan. Exchange of populations and frontier adjustments, he says, could follow. No one with the least knowledge of India could suppose that these provincial boundaries correspond to any national, ethnic, or linguistic delineation. The principle of self-determination, which is of the essence of democracy, applies to nations, not to the fortuitous divisions of a subcontinent conquered by an alien power.

The Pathan of the North-West Frontier Province and the Bengali Moslem are both, according to Jinnah, potential members of Pakistan. What have they in common? They have the same religion, but racially they are totally different; they cannot understand each other’s language; they dress differently, eat differently, and by reason of great differences in climate and geography are engaged in different occupations and forms of agriculture.

The rice-eating Moslem mopla of Malabar has far more in common with his Hindu neighbors than he has with the wheat-eating Punjabi Moslem. Only the most confused thinking could produce a two-nation theory in India, where there are dozens of distinct races and languages.

Jinnah, who is far from being confused in his thinking, knows all this. It is plain, therefore, that the Hindu-Moslem conflict should be seen, not as a religious one, but as a straightforward political and economic struggle for power, with the spoils of office as prizes.

Moslem rule

Moslem intransigence has perfectly comprehensible historical roots. For centuries before the British came, Moslems were the conquerors and rulers of India. Mahmud of Ghazni, Tamerlane, Baber, each in turn swept through the passes of the North-West, to sack and pillage the fertile plains of India, leaving behind them great pyramids of Indian skulls to bear witness to their military prowess. The lost splendors of the Mogul courts are not forgotten by Moslems. Although the Emperor Akbar, one of the ablest India ever had, was an eclectic ,in religion, it was in the main a Moslem administration that ruled the greater part of India for nearly 800 years.

Up to a century ago, Persian was the official language, and Moslems filled most of the minor official posts. Then, in 1835, Lord Macaulay’s proposal to make English the official language was adopted. Moslems resented this choice, and withdrew from competition for public positions and the professions. Not until 1875, when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan founded the Aligarh College for Moslems, was their attitude of boycott reversed; but by that time they had lost ground irretrievably to the Hindus.

Moslems to this day are the weaker community financially and educationally. Of male Hindus, 14.7 per cent are literate, compared with 10.7 per cent of the Moslems; for women the percentages are 2.1 and 1.5 (1931 census). Separate electorates have merely accentuated communal differences.

Deadlock in Congress

Congress, and many of. the influential moderate leaders outside it (such as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and C. R. Rajagopalachariar) have for long endeavored to secure Congress-League agreement. Congress leaders realize that to obtain the unity of India which they desire, they will have to make considerable concessions to the Moslems. They point out that the federal form of government envisaged would afford opportunities for local autonomy in predominantly Moslem areas; but they refuse to hand over the Hindu minorities in those areas to the unfettered control of Jinnah and his followers.

Jinnah’s growing power and prestige have only made him more obdurate. Would he have dared to go so far if he had not felt assured of outside backing – that is, from Britain? At all events, his attitude has caused Jawarhalal Nehru, the most modern and internationally-minded Congress leader, to declare that Congress will negotiate no further with the League under its present leadership.

Deadlock is complete; and if history repeats itself, the appropriate gesture for the British government would be to say that without agreement among the Indian communities, power cannot be handed over. But Britain cannot afford to repeat that time-worn bit of history now. Not only is the prestige of the Labor Government committed to the solution of the Indian dilemma, but the Indians themselves are in no mood to brook further delay.

The troubles in Indonesia (where the use of Indian troops to restore Dutch rule has greatly incensed Indian opinion) have lit a spark which Pandit Nehru has forecast will inflame the revolt of millions of colonial peoples against imperial domination.

The mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force are no mere protests against pay or conditions but are political mutinies directed against foreign rule. It is significant that they started in the two junior services drawn from politically conscious sections. Unlike the Army, which is recruited largely from illiterate peasants of the so-called martial races, volunteers for the Navy and the Air Force have to be literate in English, a rare accomplishment limited to a mere one per cent of the population. The youths are mainly townsmen and acutely conscious nationalists. Whatever the attitude of her political leaders, the people of India are united as never before in vehement opposition to foreign rule.

What will Britain do?

If Britain backs Jinnah in his intransigence, she will be accused once more of utilizing the communal divisions to delay a settlement and final handing over of power. The conservative Pioneer of Lucknow says that if freedom for India is withheld for long, a revolution is inevitable. But what if Britain calls Jinnah’s bluff? What if he is bluntly told that the question of Pakistan is not for Britain or Moslems alone to decide, but must be settled by the whole Indian people through their elected assemblies?

Britain’s Labor Party, which championed India’s freedom, has, since it came to power, gone little further than the Tories. Current pronouncements, while undoubtedly sincere, have been confined to the old formulas, with emphasis on the necessity for prior agreement among Indians, and warnings against attempts to secure results by violence. They have not dealt with the fundamental question of what the British government will do to break the stalemate.

Failure to grasp this nettle firmly has already led to suspicions that the leopard has not changed its spots, and that despite the change of government, Britain is still more interested in word-spinning than in action. Even the moderate and liberal sections of the Indian press speak of an “Anglo-Moslem conspiracy to keep India in perpetual subjection.”

This unhealthy atmosphere could be dispelled at one stroke by an announcement that on a specified date all power would be handed over to those representatives of all parties who were willing to accept it. The prospect of a fait accompli of this nature would compel Jinnah to choose between ineffectual isolation and finding a compromise of some sort. It might not be lasting, but at least the subsequent squabbles could not be laid at Britain’s door.

It is true that, in the long run, agreement between Indians themselves is the only guarantee of peaceful government and development. Under the new Constitution, India will be as free as Canada, and it will be for Indians to settle differences between themselves. But so long as there is doubt about Britain’s intentions, communal differences will be accentuated, simply because each community wants to secure the best possible terms far itself before Britain “quits India.”

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We Must Never Forget by Victoria Glenn

Posted on January 29, 2008 by kf1

We have a place to call our own again, and after so long…

We deserve this, you know. All those years of genocide against our peoples. Being kicked out of our land, forced to disperse, forced to live amongst those who did not understand us or want us. Being starved and humiliated, just because of our race. The world deserted us. It shunned us and left us to fend for ourselves.

How hard we had to fight to get what was rightfully ours…

But now we have regained the land of milk and honey…

We’ve paid for it with our very blood, with our sons and daughters, mothers and fathers…

Ahh, but now it belongs to us again… Continue Reading (at theuglytruth.wordpress.com) where the original of this is posted. Thanks to Marc Glenn

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The Blockade of Gaza – Worse Than a Crime By URI AVNERY

Posted on January 29, 2008 by kf1

It looked like the fall of the Berlin wall. And not only did it look like it. For a moment, the Rafah crossing was the Brandenburg Gate.

It is impossible not to feel exhilaration when masses of oppressed and hungry people break down the wall that is shutting them in, their eyes radiant, embracing everybody they meet – to feel so even when it is your own government that erected the wall in the first place.

The Gaza Strip is the largest prison on earth. The breaking of the Rafah wall was an act of liberation. It proves that an inhuman policy is always a stupid policy: no power can stand up against a mass of people that has crossed the border of despair.

That is the lesson of Gaza, January, 2008.

* * *

ONE MIGHT repeat the famous saying of the French statesman Boulay de la Meurthe, slightly amended: It is worse than a war crime, it is a blunder!

Months ago, the two Ehuds – Barak and Olmert – imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip, and boasted about it. Lately they have tightened the deadly noose even more, so that hardly anything at all could be brought into the Strip. Last week they made the blockade absolute – no food, no medicines. Things reached a climax when they stopped the fuel, too. Large areas of Gaza remained without electricity – incubators for premature babies, dialysis machines, pumps for water and sewage. Hundreds of thousands remained without heating in the severe cold, unable to cook, running out of food.

Again and again, Aljazeera broadcast the pictures into millions of homes in the Arab world. TV stations all over the world showed them, too. From Casablanca to Amman angry mass protest broke out and frightened the authoritarian Arab regimes. Hosny Mubarak called Ehud Barak in panic. That evening Barak was compelled to cancel, at least temporarily, the fuel-blockade he had imposed in the morning. Apart from that, the blockade remained total.

It is hard to imagine a more stupid act.

* * *

THE REASON given for the starving and freezing of one and a half million human beings, crowded into a territory of 365 square kilometers, is the continued shooting at the town of Sderot and the adjoining villages.

That is a well-chosen reason. It unites the primitive and poor parts of the Israeli public. It blunts the criticism of the UN and the governments throughout the world, who might otherwise have spoken out against a collective punishment that is, undoubtedly, a war crime under international law.

A clear picture is presented to the world: the Hamas terror regime in Gaza launches missiles at innocent Israeli civilians. No government in the world can tolerate the bombardment of its citizens from across the border. The Israeli military has not found a military answer to the Qassam missiles. Therefore there is no other way than to exert such strong pressure on the Gaza population as to make them rise up against Hamas and compel them to stop the missiles.

The day the Gaza electricity works stopped operating, our military correspondents were overjoyed: only two Qassams were launched from the Strip. So it works! Ehud Barak is a genius!

But the day after, 17 Qassams landed, and the joy evaporated. Politicians and generals were (literally) out of their minds: one politician proposed to “act crazier than them”, another proposed to “shell Gaza’s urban area indiscriminately for every Qassam launched”, a famous professor (who is a little bit deranged) proposed the exercise of “ultimate evil”.

The government scenario was a repeat of Lebanon War II (the report about which is due to be published in a few days). Then: Hizbullah captured two soldiers on the Israeli side of the border, now: Hamas fired on towns and villages on the Israeli side of the border. Then: the government decide in haste to start a war, now: the government decided in haste to impose a total blockade. Then: the government ordered the massive bombing of the civilian population in order to get them to pressure Hizbullah, now: the government decided to cause massive suffering of the civilian population in order to get them to pressure Hamas.

The results were the same in both cases: the Lebanese population did not rise up against Hizbullah, but on the contrary, people of all religious communities united behind the Shiite organization. Hassan Nasrallah became the hero of the entire Arab world. And now: the population unites behind Hamas and accuses Mahmoud Abbas of cooperation with the enemy. A mother who has no food for her children does not curse Ismail Haniyeh, she curses Olmert, Abbas and Mubarak.

* * *

SO WHAT to do? After all, it is impossible to tolerate the suffering of the inhabitants of Sderot, who are under constant fire.

What is being hidden from the embittered public is that the launching of the Qassams could be stopped tomorrow morning.

Several months ago Hamas proposed a cease-fire. It repeated the offer this week.

A cease-fire means, in the view of Hamas: the Palestinians will stop shooting Qassams and mortar shells, the Israelis will stop the incursions into Gaza, the “targeted” assassinations and the blockade.

Why doesn’t our government jump at this proposal?

Simple: in order to make such a deal, we must speak with Hamas, directly or indirectly. And this is precisely what the government refuses to do.

Why? Simple again: Sderot is only a pretext – much like the two captured soldiers were a pretext for something else altogether. The real purpose of the whole exercise is to overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza and to prevent a Hamas takeover in the West Bank.

In simple and blunt words: the government sacrifices the fate of the Sderot population on the altar of a hopeless principle. It is more important for the government to boycott Hamas – because it is now the spearhead of Palestinian resistance – than to put an end to the suffering of Sderot. All the media cooperate with this pretence.

* * *

IT HAS been said before that it is dangerous to write satire in our country – too often the satire becomes reality. Some readers may recall a satirical article I wrote months ago. In it I described the situation in Gaza as a scientific experiment designed to find out how far one can go, in starving a civilian population and turning their lives into hell, before they raise their hands in surrender.

This week, the satire has become official policy. Respected commentators declared explicitly that Ehud Barak and the army chiefs are working on the principle of “trial and error” and change their methods daily according to results. They stop the fuel to Gaza, observe how this works and backtrack when the international reaction is too negative. They stop the delivery of medicines, see how it works, etc. The scientific aim justifies the means.

The man in charge of the experiment is Defense Minister Ehud Barak, a man of many ideas and few scruples, a man whose whole turn of mind is basically inhuman. He is now, perhaps, the most dangerous person in Israel, more dangerous than Ehud Olmert and Binyamin Netanyahu, dangerous to the very existence of Israel in the long run.

The man in charge of execution is the Chief of Staff. This week we had the chance of hearing speeches by two of his predecessors, generals Moshe Ya’alon and Shaul Mofaz, in a forum with inflated intellectual pretensions. Both were discovered to have views that place them somewhere between the extreme Right and the ultra-Right. Both have a frighteningly primitive mind. There is no need to waste a word about the moral and intellectual qualities of their immediate successor, Dan Halutz. If these are the voices of the three last Chiefs of Staff, what about the incumbent, who cannot speak out as openly as they? Has this apple fallen further from the tree?

Until three days ago, the generals could entertain the opinion that the experiment was succeeding. The misery in the Gaza Strip had reached its climax. Hundreds of thousands were threatened by actual hunger. The chief of UNRWA warned of an impending human catastrophe. Only the rich could still drive a car, heat their homes and eat their fill. The world stood by and wagged its collective tongue. The leaders of the Arab states voiced empty phrases of sympathy without raising a finger.

Barak, who has mathematical abilities, could calculate when the population would finally collapse.

* * *

AND THEN something happened that none of them foresaw, in spite of the fact that it was the most foreseeable event on earth.

When one puts a million and a half people in a pressure cooker and keeps turning up the heat, it will explode. That is what happened at the Gaza-Egypt border.

At first there was a small explosion. A crowd stormed the gate, Egyptian policemen opened live fire, dozens were wounded. That was a warning.

The next day came the big attack. Palestinian fighters blew up the wall in many places. Hundreds of thousands broke out into Egyptian territory and took a deep breath. The blockade was broken.

Even before that, Mubarak was in an impossible situation. Hundreds of millions of Arabs, a billion Muslims, saw how the Israeli army had closed the Gaza strip off on three sides: the North, the East and the sea. The fourth side of the blockade was provided by the Egyptian army.

The Egyptian president, who claims the leadership of the entire Arab world, was seen as a collaborator with an inhuman operation conducted by a cruel enemy in order to gain the favor (and the money) of the Americans. His internal enemies, the Muslim Brothers, exploited the situation to debase him in the eyes of his own people.

It is doubtful if Mubarak could have persisted in this position. But the Palestinian masses relieved him of the need to make a decision. They decided for him. They broke out like a tsunami wave. Now he has to decide whether to succumb to the Israeli demand to re-impose the blockade on his Arab brothers.

And what about Barak’s experiment? What’s the next step? The options are few:

(a) To re-occupy Gaza. The army does not like the idea. It understands that this would expose thousands of soldiers to a cruel guerilla war, which would be unlike any intifada before.

(b) To tighten the blockade again and exert extreme pressure on Mubarak, including the use of Israeli influence on the US Congess to deprive him of the billions he gets every year for his services.

(c) To turn the curse into a blessing, by handing the Strip over to Mubarak, pretending that this was Barak’s hidden aim all along. Egypt would have to safeguard Israel’s security, prevent the launching of Qassams and expose its own soldiers to a Palestinian guerilla war – when it thought it was rid of the burden of this poor and barren area, and after the infrastructure there has been destroyed by the Israeli occupation. Probably Mubarak will say: Very kind of you, but no thanks.

The brutal blockade was a war crime. And worse: it was a stupid blunder.

Uri Avnery is an Israeli writer and peace activist with Gush Shalom. He is a contributor to The Politics of Anti-Semitism.

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Musharraf losing military backing – SMH – 25 Jan.08

Posted on January 25, 2008 by kf1

Lieutenant-General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani

THERE are definite signs that the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, is losing the important backing of the military after an influential group of retired officers called on him to step down.

With crucial national elections just weeks away, the Pakistan Ex-Servicemen’s Society, which includes former air marshals, admirals, generals and security agency chiefs, issued a statement demanding that Mr Musharraf step aside to pave the way for the restoration of democracy.

“General Pervez Musharraf … does not represent the unity and the symbol of the federation as president,” a statement issued by the society on Wednesday said.

It said that the group had been monitoring recent events “with great concern and anguish” and that Mr Musharraf’s resignation was “in the supreme national interest”.

The society welcomed a recent order by Mr Musharraf’s hand-picked army chief, General Ashfaq Kiyani, that serving army officers stay out of politics before the election on February 18.

“The army would be very happy to get rid of [Musharraf],” said one political analyst, Talat Massood, a former general.

Mr Musharraf, who is on a tour of European countries, used a speech in Paris on Wednesday to accuse the Western media of distorting the situation in Pakistan, including its record on democracy, human rights and the fight against terrorism.

Few predict Mr Musharraf’s immediate demise, but Pakistani analysts and some US officials say that he faces greater political challenges and has fewer allies at home and abroad.

A senior US congressional official who recently visited Pakistan said the military was ready for Mr Musharraf to step down but does not want to have to remove him, preferring instead to wait until he recognises the need to exit.

His slide on the domestic front comes as US intelligence officials have reported to Washington for the first time that the Pakistani leader may be beyond political rescue or long-term relevance.

If the opposition gains two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the elections, the President faces the possibility of impeachment. And even if he can assemble a coalition government, analysts said, he is likely to struggle politically as Pakistan confronts economic problems and a growing Islamic extremist movement.

The Bush Administration continues to support Mr Musharraf as a key ally against terrorism. The Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, met Mr Musharraf yesterday on the outskirts of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in the highest-level contact since he declared emergency rule last November.

■ Pakistani police said they had defused a roadside time bomb just minutes before the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif was due to pass by in the north-western city of Peshawar yesterday.

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Musharraf orders troops to shoot | No conditions: Pakistan | Khan warns of Kenya-type violence

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