{"id":1396,"date":"2013-08-21T21:46:12","date_gmt":"2013-08-21T11:46:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.khanfactor.com\/blog\/?p=1396"},"modified":"2013-08-21T21:46:12","modified_gmt":"2013-08-21T11:46:12","slug":"cia-confirms-role-in-1953-iran-coup","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.khanfactor.com\/blog\/?p=1396","title":{"rendered":"CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"mossadegh_time\"<\/p>\n

Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath<\/strong><\/p>\n

National Security Archive Calls for Release of Remaining Classified Record<\/strong><\/p>\n

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435<\/p>\n

Posted \u2013 August 19, 2013<\/p>\n

Edited by\u00a0Malcolm Byrne<\/strong><\/p>\n

For more information contact:
\nMalcolm Byrne<\/strong>\u00a0202\/994-7043 or\u00a0mbyrne@gwu.edu<\/a><\/p>\n

Washington, D.C.\u00a0<\/strong>\u2013 Marking the sixtieth anniversary of the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, the National Security Archive is today posting recently declassified CIA documents on the United States\u2019 role in the controversial operation. American and British involvement in Mosaddeq\u2019s ouster has long been public knowledge, but today\u2019s posting includes what is believed to be the CIA\u2019s first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the coup.<\/p>\n

The explicit reference to the CIA\u2019s role appears in a copy of an internal history,\u00a0The Battle for Iran<\/em>, dating from the mid-1970s. The agency released a heavily excised version of the account in 1981 in response to an ACLU lawsuit, but it blacked out all references to TPAJAX, the code name for the U.S.-led operation. Those references appear in the latest release. Additional CIA materials posted today include working files from Kermit Roosevelt, the senior CIA officer on the ground in Iran during the coup. They provide new specifics as well as insights into the intelligence agency\u2019s actions before and after the operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/a>
\nThis map shows the disposition of bands of \u201cruffians,\u201d paid to demonstrate by coup organizers, early on August 19, 1953. The bands gathered in the bazaar and other sections of southern Tehran, then moved north through the capital. Thug leaders\u2019 names appear at left, along with the estimated size of their groups, and their targets. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming\u00a0Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days<\/em>.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions \u2014 who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it inside Iran, and how did it succeed \u2014 are in dispute.<\/a>[1]<\/p>\n

The issue is more than academic. Political partisans on all sides, including the Iranian government, regularly invoke the coup to argue whether Iran or foreign powers are primarily responsible for the country\u2019s historical trajectory, whether the United States can be trusted to respect Iran\u2019s sovereignty, or whether Washington needs to apologize for its prior interference before better relations can occur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/a>
\nPro-Shah police, military units and undercover agents became engaged in the coup starting mid-morning August 19. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcomingThugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days<\/em>.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Also, the public release of these materials is noteworthy because CIA documents about 1953 are rare. First of all, agency officials have stated that most of the records on the coup were either lost or destroyed in the early 1960s, allegedly because the record-holders\u2019 \u201csafes were too full.\u201d<\/a>[2]<\/p>\n

Regarding public access to any remaining files (reportedly about one cubic foot of material), the intelligence community\u2019s standard procedure for decades has been to assert a blanket denial. This is in spite of commitments made two decades ago by three separate CIA directors. Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey, and John M. Deutch each vowed to open up agency historical files on a number of Cold War-era covert operations, including Iran, as a sign of the CIA\u2019s purported new policy of openness after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.<\/a>[3]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/a>
\nTanks played a critical role on August 19, with pro-Shah forces gaining control of some 24 of them from the military during the course of the day. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming\u00a0Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days<\/em>.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

A clear sign that their pledge would not be honored in practice came after the National Security Archive\u00a0filed a lawsuit<\/a>\u00a0in 1999 for a well-known internal CIA narrative about the coup. One of the operation\u2019s planners, Donald N. Wilber, prepared the account less than a year later. The CIA agreed to release just a single sentence out of the 200-page report.<\/p>\n

Despite the appearance of countless published accounts about the operation over the years \u2013 including Kermit Roosevelt\u2019s own detailed memoir, and the subsequent leak to\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>\u00a0of the 200-page CIA narrative history<\/a>[4]\u00a0\u2014 intelligence agencies typically refused to budge. They have insisted on making a distinction between publicly available information on U.S. activities from non-government sources and official acknowledgement of those activities, even several decades after the fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/a>
\nAnti-Mosaddeq armed forces converged on his house (left side of map) beginning around 4:00 pm, eventually forcing him to escape over a garden wall before his house was destroyed. By then, Zahedi had already addressed the nation from the Radio Transmission Station. (Courtesy of Ali Rahnema, author of the forthcoming\u00a0Thugs, Turn-coats, Soldiers, Spooks: Anatomy of Overthrowing Mosaddeq in Four Days<\/em>.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

While the National Security Archive applauds the CIA\u2019s decision to make these materials available, today\u2019s posting shows clearly that these materials could have been safely declassified many years ago without risk of damage to the national security. (See sidebar, \u201cWhy is the Coup Still a Secret?\u201d)<\/p>\n

Archive Deputy Director Malcolm Byrne called for the U.S. intelligence community to make fully available the remaining records on the coup period. \u201cThere is no longer good reason to keep secrets about such a critical episode in our recent past. The basic facts are widely known to every school child in Iran. Suppressing the details only distorts the history, and feeds into myth-making on all sides.\u201d<\/p>\n

To supplement the recent CIA release, the National Security Archive is including two other, previously available internal accounts of the coup. One is the narrative referred to above: a 1954 Clandestine Services History prepared by Donald N. Wilber, one of the operation\u2019s chief architects, which\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>\u00a0obtained by a leak and first posted on its site in April 2000.<\/p>\n

The other item is a heavily excised 1998 piece \u2014 \u201cZendebad, Shah!<\/em>\u201d \u2014 by an in-house CIA historian. (The Archive has asked the CIA to re-review the document\u2019s excessive deletions for future release.)<\/p>\n

The posting also features an earlier declassification of\u00a0The Battle for Iran<\/em>\u00a0for purposes of comparison with the latest release. The earlier version includes portions that were withheld in the later release. As often happens, government classification officials had quite different \u2014 sometimes seemingly arbitrary \u2014 views about what could and could not be safely made public.<\/p>\n

Read together, the three histories offer fascinating variations in perspective \u2014 from an agency operative to two in-house historians (the last being the most dispassionate). Unfortunately, they still leave wide gaps in the history, including on some fundamental questions which may never be satisfactorily answered \u2014 such as how to apportion responsibility for planning and carrying out the coup among all the Iranian and outside actors involved.<\/p>\n

But all 21 of the CIA items posted today (in addition to 14 previously unpublished British documents \u2014 see Sidebar), reinforce the conclusion that the United States, and the CIA in particular, devoted extensive resources and high-level policy attention toward bringing about Mosaddeq\u2019s overthrow, and smoothing over the aftermath.<\/p>\n

Have the British Been Meddling with the FRUS Retrospective Volume on 1953?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Foreign Office Worried over \u201cVery Embarrassing\u201d Revelations, Documents Show<\/strong><\/p>\n

The United Kingdom sought to expunge \u201cvery embarrassing\u201d information about its role in the 1953 coup in Iran from the official U.S. history of the period, British documents confirm. The Foreign Office feared that a planned State Department publication would undermine U.K. standing in Iran, according to declassified records posted on the National Security Archive\u2019s Web site today.<\/p>\n

The British censorship attempt happened in 1978, but London\u2019s concerns may play a role even today in holding up the State Department\u2019s long-awaited history \u2013 even though U.S. law required its publication years ago.<\/p>\n

The declassified documents, from the Foreign Office (Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1968), shed light on a protracted controversy over crucial gaps in the State Department\u2019s authoritative\u00a0Foreign Relations of the United States<\/em>\u00a0(FRUS) series. The blank spots on Iran involve the CIA- and MI6-backed plot to overthrow the country\u2019s prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. Six decades after his ouster, some signs point to the CIA as the culprit for refusing to allow basic details about the event to be incorporated into the FRUS compilation.<\/a>[1]<\/p>\n

Recently, the CIA has declassified a number of records relating to the 1953 coup, including a version of an internal history that specifically states the agency planned and helped implement the coup. (The National Security Archive obtained the documents through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.) This suggests that ongoing CIA inflexibility over the FRUS volume is not so much a function of the agency\u2019s worries about its own role being exposed as a function of its desire to protect lingering British sensitivities about 1953 \u2013 especially regarding the activities of U.K. intelligence services. There is also evidence that State Department officials have been just as anxious to shield British interests over the years.<\/p>\n

Regardless of the reasons for this continued secrecy, an unfortunate consequence of withholding these materials is to guarantee that American (and world) public understanding of this pivotal episode will remain distorted. Another effect is to keep the issue alive in the political arena, where it is regularly exploited by circles in Iran opposed to constructive ties with the United States.<\/p>\n

Background on FRUS and the Mosaddeq Period<\/strong><\/p>\n

By statute, the FRUS series is required to present \u201ca thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record\u201d of American foreign policy.<\/a>[2]\u00a0That law came about partly as a consequence of the failure of the original volume covering the Mosaddeq period (published in 1989) to mention the U.S. role in his overthrow. The reaction of the scholarly community and interested public was outrage. Prominent historian Bruce Kuniholm, a former member of State\u2019s Policy Planning Staff, called the volume \u201ca fraud.\u201d<\/a>[3]<\/p>\n

The full story of the scandal has been detailed elsewhere,<\/a>[4]\u00a0but most observers blamed the omission on the intelligence community (IC) for refusing to open its relevant files. In fact, the IC was not alone. Senior Department officials joined in opposing requests for access to particular classified records by the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), the group of independent scholars charged with advising the Department\u2019s own Office of the Historian.<\/a>[5]\u00a0The head of the HAC, Warren Cohen, resigned in protest in 1990 citing his inability to ensure the integrity of the FRUS series. Congress became involved and, in a display of bipartisanship that would be stunning today (Democratic Senator Daniel P. Moynihan getting Republican Jesse Helms to collaborate), lawmakers passed a bill to prevent similar historical distortions. As Cohen and others pointed out, while Moscow was disgorging its scandalous Cold War secrets, Washington was taking a distinctly Soviet approach to its own history.<\/a>[6]<\/p>\n

By 1998, State\u2019s historians and the HAC had decided to produce a \u201cretrospective\u201d volume on the Iran coup that would help to correct the record. They planned other volumes to cover additional previously airbrushed covert activities (in Guatemala, the Congo, etc.). It was a promising step, yet 15 years later, while a couple of publications have materialized, several others have not \u2013 including the Iran volume.<\/a>[7]<\/p>\n

Institutional Delays<\/strong><\/p>\n

A review of the available minutes of\u00a0HAC meetings<\/a>\u00a0makes it apparent that over the past decade multiple policy, bureaucratic, and logistical hurdles have interfered with progress. Some of these are routine, even inevitable \u2013 from the complications of multi-agency coordination to frequent personnel changes. Others are more specific to the realm of intelligence, notably a deep-seated uneasiness in parts of the CIA over the notion of unveiling putative secrets.<\/p>\n

In the Fall of 2001, an ominous development for the HO gave a sense of where much of the power lay in its relationship with the CIA. According to notes of a public HAC meeting in October 2001, the CIA, on instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence, decided unilaterally \u201cthat there could be no new business\u201d regarding FRUS until the two sides signed an MOU. Agency officials said the document would address legitimate IC concerns; HAC members worried it would mainly boost CIA control over the series. The agency specifically held up action on four volumes to make its point, while HAC historians countered that the volumes were being \u201cheld hostage\u201d and the HO was being forced to work \u201cunder the threat of \u2018blackmail\u2019.\u201d<\/a>[8]<\/p>\n

The CIA held firm and an agreement emerged in May 2002 that, at least from available information, appears to bend over backwards to give the IC extraordinary safeguards without offering much reassurance about key HO interests. For instance, the MOU states that the CIA must \u201cmeet HO\u2019s statutory requirement\u201d \u2013 hardly something that seems necessary to spell out. At the same time, it allows the CIA to review materials not once, but again even after a manuscript has passed through formal declassification, and once more after it is otherwise in final form and ready for printing. In the context of the disputed Iran volume, HAC members worried about the \u201crandom\u201d nature of these provisions which gave the agency \u201ca second bite at the apple.\u201d<\/a>[9]\u00a0The implication is that the CIA will feel little obligation to help meet the HO\u2019s legal requirement if it believes its own \u201cequities\u201d are at stake. (This of course may still affect the Iran volume, currently scheduled for 2014 publication.)<\/p>\n

Is It the British?<\/strong><\/p>\n

As mentioned, the CIA has begun to release documentation in recent years making explicit its connection to the Mosaddeq overthrow. Even earlier, by 2002, the State Department and CIA jointly began compiling an Iran retrospective volume. These are not signs of a fundamental institutional unwillingness to publish American materials on the coup (although parts of the CIA continued to resist the notion). The HO even tried at least twice previously to organize a joint project with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Iran, but the idea evidently went nowhere.<\/a>[10]<\/p>\n

In 2004, two years later, the State Department\u2019s designated historian finished compiling the volume. According to that historian, he included a number of records obtained from research at the then-Public Record Office in London. Among his findings was \u201cmaterial that documents the British role.\u201d He added that he had also located State Department records \u201cthat illustrate the British role.\u201d<\/a>[11]\u00a0By no later than June 2006, the Iran volume had entered the declassification queue. At the June 2006 HAC session, CIA representatives said \u201cthey believed the committee would be satisfied with the [declassification] reviews.\u201d<\/p>\n

Up to that point, the agency\u2019s signals seemed generally positive about the prospects of making public previously closed materials. But in the six years since, no Iran volume has emerged. Even State\u2019s committee of historians apparently has never gotten a satisfactory explanation as to why.<\/a>[12]<\/p>\n

When the IC withholds records, \u201csources and methods\u201d are often the excuse. The CIA is loath to release anything it believes would reveal how the agency conducts its activities. (For many years, the CIA kept secret the fact that it used balloons to drop leaflets over Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and would not confirm or deny whether it compiled biographical sketches of Communist leaders.) On the other hand, clandestine operations have been named in more than 20 other FRUS publications.<\/a>[13]\u00a0One of these was the retrospective volume on PBSUCCESS, the controversial overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Furthermore, the agency has released troubling materials such as assassination manuals that demonstrate how to murder political opponents using anything from \u201cedge weapons\u201d to \u201cbare hands.\u201d In 2007, in response to a 15-year-old National Security Archive FOIA request, the CIA finally released its file of \u201cfamily jewels\u201d detailing an assortment of infamous activities. from planning to poison foreign leaders to conducting illegal surveillance on American journalists.<\/p>\n

If the agency felt it could part with such high-profile sources and methods information, along with deeply embarrassing revelations about itself, why not in the Iran case? Perhaps the British are just saying no, and their American counterparts are quietly going along.<\/p>\n

State Department Early Warning \u2013 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

The FCO documents in this posting (Documents 22-35<\/a>) strongly support this conclusion. Theytell a fascinating story of transatlantic cooperation and diplomatic concern at a turbulent time. It was a State Department official who first alerted the FCO to plans by the Department\u2019s historians to publish an official account of the 1953 coup period. The Department\u2019s Iran expert warned that the records could have \u201cpossibly damaging consequences\u201d not only for London but for the Shah of Iran, who was fighting for survival as he had 25 years earlier (Document 22<\/a>). Two days later, FCO officials began to pass the message up the line that \u201cvery embarrassing things about the British\u201d were likely to be in the upcoming FRUS compilation (Document 23<\/a>). FCO officials reported that officers on both the Iran and Britain desks at State were prepared to help keep those materials out of the public domain, at least for the time being (Document 33<\/a>). Almost 35 years later, those records are still inaccessible.<\/p>\n

The British government\u2019s apparent unwillingness to acknowledge what the world already knows is difficult for most outsiders to understand. It becomes positively baffling when senior public figures who are fully aware of the history have already acknowledged London\u2019s role. In 2009, former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw publicly remarked on Britain\u2019s part in toppling Mosaddeq, which he categorized as one of many outside \u201cinterferences\u201d in Iranian affairs in the last century.<\/a>[14]\u00a0Yet, present indications are that the U.K. government is not prepared to release either its own files or evidently to approve the opening of American records that might help bring some degree of closure to this protracted historic \u2013 and historiographical \u2013 episode.<\/p>\n

(Jump to the\u00a0British documents<\/a>)<\/p>\n

NOTES<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/a>[1]\u00a0A recent article drawing attention to the controversy is Stephen R. Weissman, \u201cWhy is U.S. Withholding Old Documents on Covert Ops in Congo, Iran?\u201d\u00a0The Christian Science Monitor<\/em>, March 25, 2011. (http:\/\/www.csmonitor.com\/Commentary\/Opinion\/2011\/0325\/Why-is-US-withholding-old-documents-on-covert-ops-in-Congo-Iran\u00a0<\/a>)<\/p>\n

<\/a>[2]\u00a0Section 198, Public Law 102-138.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[3]\u00a0Bruce Kuniholm, \u201cForeign Relations, Public Relations, Accountability, and Understanding,\u201d American Historical Association,\u00a0Perspectives<\/em>, May-June 1990.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[4]\u00a0In addition to the Kuniholm and Weissman items cited above, see also Stephen R. Weissman, \u201cCensoring American Diplomatic History,\u201d American Historical Association,\u00a0Perspectives on History<\/em>, September 2011.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[5]\u00a0Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, \u201c\u2018A Burden for the Department\u2019?: To The 1991\u00a0FRUS<\/em>Statute,\u201d February 6, 2012,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/frus150\/research\/to-the-1991-frus-statute<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[6]\u00a0Editorial, \u201cHistory Bleached at State,\u201d\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>, May 16, 1990.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[7]\u00a0Retrospective compilations on Guatemala (2003) and the intelligence community (2007) during the 1950s have appeared; collections on the Congo and Chile are among those that have not.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[8]\u00a0HAC minutes, October 15-16, 2001,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/october-2001<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[9]\u00a0HAC minutes, July 22-23, 2002,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/july-2002<\/a>; and December 14-15, 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/december-2009<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[10]\u00a0HAC minutes, July 22-23, 2002,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/july-2002<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[11]HAC minutes, March 6-7, 2006,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/march-2006<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[12]\u00a0See HAC minutes for July 12-13, 2004,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/july-2004<\/a>; September 20-21, 2004,\u00a0http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/september-2004<\/a>; September 8-9, 2008,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/september-2008<\/a>; for example.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[13]\u00a0Comments of then-FRUS series editor Edward Keefer at the February 26-27, 2007, HAC meeting,http:\/\/history.state.gov\/about\/hac\/february-2007<\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[14]\u00a0Quoted in Souren Melikian, \u201cShow Ignores Essential Questions about Iranian King\u2019s Role,\u201d\u00a0The International Herald Tribune<\/em>, February 21, 2009.<\/p>\n

DOCUMENTS<\/strong><\/p>\n

CIA Records<\/strong><\/p>\n

CIA Internal Histories<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>Document 1 (Cover Sheet<\/a>,\u00a0Summary<\/a>,\u00a0I<\/a>,\u00a0II<\/a>,\u00a0III<\/a>,\u00a0IV<\/a>,\u00a0V<\/a>,\u00a0VI<\/a>,\u00a0VII<\/a>,\u00a0VIII<\/a>,\u00a0IX<\/a>,\u00a0X<\/a>,\u00a0Appendix A<\/a>,\u00a0Appendix B<\/a>,\u00a0Appendix C<\/a>,\u00a0Appendix D<\/a>,Appendix E<\/a>): CIA, Clandestine Services History,\u00a0Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 \u2013 August 1953<\/em>, Dr. Donald N. Wilber, March 1954<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source:\u00a0The New York Times<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Donald Wilber was a principal planner of the initial joint U.S.-U.K. coup attempt of August 1953. This 200-page account is one of the most valuable remaining records describing the event because Wilber wrote it within months of the overthrow and provided a great deal of detail. Like any historical document, it must be read with care, taking into account the author\u2019s personal perspective, purpose in writing it, and audience. The CIA routinely prepared histories of important operations for use by future operatives. They were not intended to be made public.<\/p>\n

Document 2<\/a>: CIA, Summary, \u201cCampaign to Install a Pro-Western Government in Iran,\u201d draft of internal history of the coup, undated<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This heavily excised summary was almost certainly prepared in connection with Donald Wilber\u2019s Clandestine Services History (Document 1). By all indications written not long after the coup (1953-54), it includes several of the phrases Wilber used \u2014 \u201cquasi-legal,\u201d and \u201cwar of nerves,\u201d for example. The text clearly gives the impression that the author attributes the coup\u2019s eventual success to a combination of external and internal developments. Beginning by listing a number of specific steps taken by the U.S. under the heading \u201cCIA ACTION,\u201d the document notes at the end (in a handwritten edit): \u201cThese actions resulted in literal revolt of the population, [1+ lines excised]. The military and security forces joined the populace, Radio Tehran was taken over, and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 [sic] Aug 53.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 3\u00a0a<\/a>\u00a0&\u00a0b<\/a>: CIA, History,\u00a0The Battle for Iran<\/em>, author\u2019s name excised, undated (c. mid-1970s) \u2013 (Two versions \u2013 declassified in 1981 and 2011)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This posting provides two separate releases of the same document, declassified 30 years apart (1981 and 2011). Each version contains portions excised in the other. Though no date is given, judging from citations in the footnotes\u00a0The Battle for Iran<\/em>\u00a0was written in or after 1974. It is marked \u201cAdministrative \u2013 Working Paper\u201d and contains a number of handwritten edits. The author was a member of the CIA\u2019s History Staff who acknowledges \u201cthe enthusiastic cooperation\u201d of the agency\u2019s Directorate of Operations. The author provides confirmation that most of the relevant files were destroyed in 1962; therefore the account relies on the relatively few remaining records as well as on public sources. The vast majority of the covert action portion (Section III) remains classified, although the most recent declassification of the document leaves in some brief, but important, passages. An unexpected feature of the document (Appendix C) is the inclusion of a series of lengthy excerpts of published accounts of the overthrow designed, apparently, to underscore how poorly the public understood the episode at the time.<\/p>\n

Document 4<\/a>: CIA, History,\u00a0\u201cZendebad, Shah!\u201d: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953<\/em>, Scott A. Koch, June 1998<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most recent known internal history of the coup, \u201cZendebad, Shah!\u201d was written by an in-house agency historian in 1998. It is heavily excised (but currently undergoing re-review by the CIA), with virtually all paragraphs marked Confidential or higher omitted from the public version. Still, it is a useful account written by someone without a stake in the events and drawing on an array of U.S. government and published sources not available to the earlier CIA authors.<\/p>\n

CIA Records Immediately Before and After the Coup<\/em><\/p>\n

Document 5<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 14, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kermit Roosevelt conveys information about rapidly unfolding events in Tehran, including Mosaddeq\u2019s idea for a referendum on his remaining in office, the prospect of his closing the Majles, and most importantly the impact President Eisenhower\u2019s recent letter has had in turning society against the prime minister. The U.S. government publicized Eisenhower\u2019s undiplomatic letter turning down Mosaddeq\u2019s request for financial aid. The move was one of the ways Washington hoped to weaken his political standing.<\/p>\n

Document 6<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 15, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Responding to the resignation of Mosaddeq supporters from the Majles, Kermit Roosevelt fires off a plan to ensure that other Majles members keep the parliament functioning, the eventual goal being to engineer a no-confidence in Mosaddeq. The memo provides an interesting clue on the subject of whether CIA operatives ever bought votes in the Majles, about which other CIA sources are vague. Roosevelt urges that as many deputies as possible be \u201cpersuaded\u201d to take\u00a0bast<\/em>\u00a0in the parliament. \u201cRecognize will be necessary expend money this purpose and determine precisely who does what.\u201d At the conclusion of the document he appears to tie this scheme into the previously elaborated \u2014 but clearly evolving \u2014 coup plan.<\/p>\n

Document 7<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 16, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Roosevelt reports on developing plans involving Fazlollah Zahedi, the man who has been chosen to replace Mosaddeq. CIA sources, including the Wilber history, indicate that the military aspects of the plan were to be largely Zahedi\u2019s responsibility. This memo supports that (even though many details are excised), but also provides some insight into the differences in expectations between the Americans and Zahedi. With some skepticism (\u201cZahedi claims \u2026\u201d), Roosevelt spells out a series of events Zahedi envisions that presumably would bring him to the premiership, albeit in a very round-about way. His thinking is clearly prompted by his declared unwillingness to commit \u201c\u2018political suicide\u2019 by extra-legal move.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 8<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 17, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

The CIA\u2019s Tehran station reports on the recent resignations of independent and opposition Majles members. The idea, an opposition deputy tells the station, was to avert Mosaddeq\u2019s planned public referendum. The memo gives a bit of insight into the fluidity and uncertainty of developments with each faction undoubtedly elaborating their own strategies and tactics to a certain degree.<\/p>\n

Document 9<\/a>: CIA, note to Mr. [John] Waller, July 22, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This brief note conveys much about both U.S. planning and hopes for Mosaddeq\u2019s overthrow. It is a request from Kermit Roosevelt to John Waller and Donald Wilber to make sure that a formal U.S. statement is ready in advance of \u201ca \u2018successful\u2019 coup.\u201d (See Document 10)<\/p>\n

Document 10<\/a>: CIA, note forwarding proposed text of State Department release for after the coup, August 5, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This draft text from the State Department appears to be a result of Roosevelt\u2019s request (Document 9) to have an official statement available for use after completion of the operation. The draft predates Mosaddeq\u2019s ouster by two weeks, but its language \u2014 crediting \u201cthe Iranian people, under the leadership of their Shah,\u201d for the coup \u2014 tracks precisely with the neutral wording used by both the State Department and Foreign Office in their official paperwork after the fact.<\/p>\n

Document 11<\/a>: CIA, Memo, \u201cProposed Commendation for Communications Personnel who have serviced the TPAJAX Operation,\u201d Frank G. Wisner to The Acting Director of Central Intelligence, August 20, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wisner recommends a special commendation for the work performed by the communications specialists who kept CIA headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup period. \u201cI am sure that you are aware of the exceptionally heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated,\u201d Wisner writes \u2014 an unintentionally poignant remark given how little of that documentation has survived.<\/p>\n

Document 12<\/a>: CIA, Memo, \u201cCommendation,\u201d Frank G. Wisner to CNEA Division, August 26, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wisner also requests a commendation for John Waller, the coup overseer at CIA headquarters, \u201cfor his work in TPAJAX.\u201d Waller\u2019s conduct \u201cin no small measure, contributed to the successful result.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 13<\/a>: CIA, \u201cLetter of Commendation [Excised],\u201d author and recipient names excised, August 26, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Evidently after reflection, Frank Wisner concludes that there are troubling \u201csecurity implications\u201d involved in providing a letter of commendation for a covert operation.<\/p>\n

Document 14<\/a>: CIA, Memo, \u201cAnti-Tudeh Activities of Zahedi Government,\u201d author\u2019s name excised, September 10, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

A priority of the Zahedi government after the coup was to go after the Tudeh Party, which had been a mainstay of support for Mosaddeq, even if the relationship was mostly one of mutual convenience. This is one of several memos reporting details on numbers of arrests, names of suspected Central Committee members, and planned fate of arrestees. The report claims with high specificity on Soviet assistance being provided to the Tudeh, including printing party newspapers at the embassy. Signs are reportedly mixed as to whether the party and pro-Mosaddeq elements will try to combine forces again.<\/p>\n

Document 15<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 21, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Roosevelt reports on an intense period of political maneuvering at high levels in the Zahedi government. Intrigues, patronage (including a report that the government has been giving financial support to Ayatollah Behbehani, and that the latter\u2019s son is angling for a Cabinet post), and corruption are all dealt with in this memo.<\/p>\n

Document 16<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], September 24, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

A restless Zahedi is reported to be active on a number of fronts including trying to get a military tribunal to execute Mosaddeq and urging the Shah to fire several senior military officers including Chief of Staff Batmangelich. The Shah reportedly has not responded to Zahedi\u2019s previous five messages.<\/p>\n

Document 17<\/a>: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 2, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

According to this account, the Shah remained deeply worried about Mosaddeq\u2019s influence, even while incarcerated. Roosevelt reports the Shah is prepared to execute Mosaddeq (after a guilty verdict that is a foregone conclusion) if his followers and the Tudeh take any threatening action.<\/p>\n

Document 18<\/a>: CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 9, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iranian politics did not calm down entirely after the coup, as this memo indicates, reporting on \u201cviolent disagreements\u201d between Zahedi and his own supporter, Hoseyn Makki, whom Zahedi threatened to shoot if he accosted any senators trying to attend a Senate session. Roosevelt also notes two recent payments from Zahedi to Ayatollah Behbehani. The source for these provocative reports is unknown, but presumably is named in the excised portion at the top of the memo.<\/p>\n

Document 19<\/a>: CIA, memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], October 20, 1953<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

Roosevelt notes a meeting between the new prime minister, Zahedi, and Ayatollah Kashani, a politically active cleric and once one of Mosaddeq\u2019s chief supporters. Kashani reportedly carps about some of his former National Front allies. Roosevelt concludes Zahedi wants \u201csplit\u201d the front \u201cby wooing Kashani away.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 20<\/a>: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, \u201cOur National Character,\u201d undated<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This appears to be an example of CIA propaganda aimed at undermining Mosaddeq\u2019s public standing, presumably prepared during Summer 1953. Like other examples in this posting, the CIA provided no description when it released the document. It certainly fits the pattern of what Donald Wilber and others after him have described about the nature of the CIA\u2019s efforts to plant damaging innuendo in local Iranian media. In this case, the authors extol the virtues of the Iranian character, particularly as admired by the outside world, then decry the descent into \u201chateful,\u201d \u201crough\u201d and \u201crude\u201d behavior Iranians have begun to exhibit \u201cever since the alliance between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 21<\/a>: CIA, Propaganda Commentary, \u201cMossadeq\u2019s Spy Service,\u201d undated<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act release<\/strong><\/p>\n

This propaganda piece accuses the prime minister of pretending to be \u201cthe savior of Iran\u201d and alleges that he has instead built up a vast spying apparatus which he has trained on virtually every sector of society, from the army to newspapers to political and religious leaders. Stirring up images of his purported alliance with \u201cmurderous Qashqai Khans\u201d and the Bolsheviks, the authors charge: \u201cIs this the way you save Iran, Mossadeq? We know what you want to save. You want to save Mossadeq\u2019s dictatorship in Iran!\u201d<\/p>\n

<\/a>British Records<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Document 22<\/a>\u00a0: FCO, Summary Record, \u201cBritish-American Planning Talks, Washington,\u201d October 10-11, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) FCO 8\/3216, File No. P 333\/2, Folder, \u201cIran: Release of Confidential Records,\u201d 1 Jan \u2013 31 Dec 1978 (hereafter: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216)<\/strong><\/p>\n

In October 1978, a delegation of British FCO officials traveled to Washington for two days of discussions and comparing of notes on the world situation with their State Department counterparts. The director of the Department\u2019s Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake (later to serve as President Bill Clinton\u2019s national security advisor), led the American side. Other participants were experts from various geographical and functional bureaus, including Henry Precht, the head of the Iran Desk.<\/p>\n

Beginning in paragraph 22, Precht gives a dour summary of events in Iran: \u201cthe worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years.\u201d In a fascinating back-and-forth about the Shah, Precht warns it is \u201cdifficult to see how the Shah could survive.\u201d The British politely disagree, voicing confidence that the monarchy will survive. Even his State Department colleagues \u201cshowed surprise at the depth of Mr. Precht\u2019s gloom.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the course of his presentation (paragraph 23), Precht notes almost in passing that the State Department is reviewing its records from 1952-1954 for eventual release. A British representative immediately comments that \u201cif that were the case, he hoped HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] would be consulted.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 23<\/a>: FCO, Minute, B.L. Crowe to R.S. Gorham, \u201cAnglo-American Planning Talks: Iran,\u201d October 12, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

This memo recounts Precht\u2019s dramatic presentation on Iran two days earlier (see previous document). \u201cHis was essentially a policy of despair,\u201d the author writes. When the British follow up with the Americans about Precht\u2019s outlook of gloom, they find that State Department and National Security Council (NSC) staff were just as bewildered by his remarks. One NSC staff member calls them \u201cbullshit.\u201d Policy Planning Director Lake laments the various \u201cindiscreet and sensitive things\u201d the Americans said at the meeting, and asks the British to \u201cbe very careful\u201d how they handle them.<\/p>\n

\u201cOn a completely different subject,\u201d the minute continues, \u201cPrecht let out \u2026 that he was having to go through the records of the 1952\/53 Mossadeq period with a view to their release under the Freedom of Information Act [sic]. He said that if released, there would be some very embarrassing things about the British in them.\u201d (Much of this passage is underlined for emphasis.) The note goes on: \u201cI made a strong pitch that we should be consulted,\u201d but the author adds, \u201cI imagine that it is American documents about the British rather than documents on which HMG have any lien which are involved.\u201d (This is a point that may still be at issue today since the question of discussing American documents with foreign governments is very different from negotiating over the use of foreign government records.)<\/p>\n

Document 24<\/a>: FCO, Letter, R.J. Carrick to B.L. Crowe, October 13, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

An FCO official reports that Precht recently approached another British diplomat to say that \u201che hoped we had not been too shocked\u201d by his recent presentation. He says Precht acknowledged being \u201cover-pessimistic\u201d and that in any event he had not been offering anyone\u2019s view but his own.<\/a>[5]\u00a0According to the British, NSC staff members put more stock in the assessments of the U.K. ambassador to Tehran, Sir Anthony Parsons, than in Precht\u2019s. The writer adds that U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan also shares Parsons\u2019 judgment, and concludes, without indicating a source, that even \u201cHenry Precht has now accepted Sullivan\u2019s view!\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 25<\/a>: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to Mr. Cullimore, \u201cIran: The Ghotbi Pamphlet and the Mussadeq Period,\u201d October 17, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

This cover note (to Document 24) refers to Precht\u2019s revelation about the impending American publication of documents on the Mosaddeq period. The author suggests giving some consideration to the implications of this for \u201cour own record of the time.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 26<\/a>: FCO, Letter, B.L. Crowe to Sir A. Duff, \u201cAnglo-American Planning Talks,\u201d October 19, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

FCO official Brian Crowe summarizes the October 10-11 joint U.S.-U.K. talks. The document is included here mainly for the sake of comprehensiveness, since it is part of the FCO folder on the FRUS matter. The writer repeats the remark from State\u2019s Anthony Lake that \u201csome of the comments\u201d from the U.S. side on Iran (among other topics) were \u201chighly sensitive\u201d and should not be disclosed \u2013 even to other American officials.<\/p>\n

Document 27<\/a>: FCO, Letter, J.O. Kerr to B.L. Crowe, \u201cTalks with the US Planners: Iran,\u201d October 24, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

This brief note shows that word is moving up the line in the FCO about the forthcoming FRUS volume on Iran. The writer conveys a request to have the U.K. embassy in Washington check the risks involved in the potential release of U.S. documents, and \u201cwhen the State Department propose to raise them formally with us.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 28<\/a>: FCO, letter, G.G.H. Walden to B.L. Crowe, \u201cAnglo-American Planning Talks: Iran,\u201d November 10, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

Still more interest in the possible State Department release is reflected in this short note, now a month after the joint U.S.-U.K. talks. Here and elsewhere, the British notes erroneously report that the release will come under the Freedom of Information Act (or the Public Information Act, as given here); they are actually slated for inclusion in the\u00a0Foreign Relations of the United States<\/em>\u00a0(FRUS) series.<\/p>\n

Document 29<\/a>: FCO, R.S. Gorham cover note to Streams, \u201cIran: Release of Confidential Records,\u201d attaching draft letter to Washington, November 14, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

This note and draft are included primarily because they are part of the FCO file on this topic. However, the draft letter does contain some different wording from the final version (Document 31).<\/p>\n

Document 30<\/a>: U.S. Embassy London, Letter, Ronald I. Spiers to Sir Thomas Brimelow, March 24, 1975<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

Three years before Precht\u2019s revelation to his British counterparts, the U.K. sought general guidance from the State Department about how the U.S. would handle \u201cclassified information received from Her Majesty\u2019s Government.\u201d The month before, robust amendments to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act had gone into effect. This letter from the number two official in London at the time, Ronald Spiers, offers a detailed response. Britain\u2019s awareness of the new amendments and anxiousness about their implications (including the fairly abstruse question of how secret documents would be handled in court cases) show how sensitive an issue the British considered protection of their information to be. The U.S. Charg\u00e9 is equally anxious to provide the necessary reassurances. (More than a decade later, Spiers would sharply oppose efforts by the State Department\u2019s Historical Advisory Committee to gain access to restricted documentation for the FRUS series.<\/a>[6])<\/p>\n

Document 31<\/a>: FCO, Letter, R.S. Gorham to R.J.S. Muir, \u201cIran: Release of Confidential Records,\u201d November 16, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

The British embassy in Washington is alerted to the possibility of documents being released on the 1952-54 period. The FCO clearly expects that, as apparently has been the case in the past, \u201cthere should be no difficulty for the Americans in first removing \u2026 copies of any telegrams etc from us and US documents which record our views, even in the case of papers which are not strictly speaking \u2018official information furnished by a foreign government.\u2019\u201d (This raises important questions about how far U.S. officials typically go to accommodate allied sensibilities, including to the point of censoring U.S. documents.) \u201cWhat is not clear,\u201d the letter continues, \u201cis whether they could withhold American documents which referred to joint Anglo\/US views about, say, the removal of Musaddiq in 1953.\u201d<\/p>\n

Document 32<\/a>: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, \u201cIran\u201d Release of Confidential Records,\u201d December 14, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

This follow-up to Gorham\u2019s earlier request (Document 31) is another reflection of U.K. skittishness about the pending document release. The embassy officer reports that he has spoken to Henry Precht \u201cseveral times\u201d about it, and that the British Desk at the State Department is also looking into the matter on London\u2019s behalf. The objective is to persuade the Department to agree to withhold not only British documents but American ones, too.<\/p>\n

Document 33<\/a>: British Embassy in Washington, Letter, R.J.S. Muir to R.S. Gorham, \u201cIran: Release of Confidential Records,\u201d December 22, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

The embassy updates the FCO on the status of the Iran records. Precht informs the embassy that he is prepared to \u201csit on the papers\u201d to help postpone their publication. Precht\u2019s priority is the potential impact on current U.S. and U.K. policy toward Iran. Conversely, a historian at the State Department makes it clear that his office feels no obligation even to consult with the British about any non-U.K. documents being considered. The historian goes on to say \u201cthat he had in the past resisted requests from other governments for joint consultation and would resist very strongly any such request from us.\u201d But the same historian admits that the embassy might \u201cbe successful\u201d if it approached the policy side of the Department directly.<\/p>\n

The embassy letter ends with a \u201cfootnote\u201d noting that State Department historians \u201chave read the 1952-54 papers and find them a \u2018marvelous compilation.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

Interestingly, a handwritten comment on the letter from another FCO official gives a different view about the likely consequences of the upcoming document publication: \u201cAs the revolution [in Iran] is upon us, the problem is no longer Anglo-American: the first revelations will be from the Iranian side.\u201d In other words, the revolution will bring its own damaging results, and the revolutionaries will not need any further ammunition from the West.<\/p>\n

Document 34<\/a>: FCO, Cover Note, Cohen (?) to Lucas, circa December 22, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source: TNA: PRO FCO 8\/3216<\/strong><\/p>\n

In a handwritten remark at the bottom of this cover note, an unidentified FCO official voices much less anxiety than some of his colleagues about the possible repercussions of the disclosure of documents on Iran. Referring to a passage in paragraph 3 of the attached letter (see previous document), the writer asks: \u201cwhy should we be concerned about \u2018any other documents\u2019?\u201d The writer agrees with the cover note author\u2019s suggestion to \u201clet this matter rest for a while,\u201d then continues: \u201cI think we ought positively to seek the agreement of others interested to Y.\u201d (\u201cY\u201d identifies the relevant passage on the cover note.)<\/p>\n

Document 35<\/a>: FCO, Meeting Record, \u201cIran: Policy Review,\u201d December 20, 1978<\/strong><\/p>\n

Source : British National Archives, FCO 8\/3351, File No. NB P 011\/1 (Part A), Title \u201cInternal Political Situation in Iran\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

British Foreign Secretary David Owen chairs this FCO meeting on the unfolding crisis in Iran. It offers a window into London\u2019s assessment of the revolution and British concerns for the future (including giving \u201chighest priority to getting paid for our major outstanding debts\u201d). The document also shows that not everyone at the FCO believed significant harm would necessarily come to British interests from the FRUS revelations. Although he is speaking about events in 1978, I.T.M. Lucas\u2019 comment could apply just as forcefully to the impact of disclosing London\u2019s actions in 1953: \u201c[I]t was commonly known in [the Iranian] Government who the British were talking to, and there was nothing we could do to disabuse public opinion of its notions about the British role in Iran.\u201d (p. 2)<\/p>\n

\n

NOTES<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/a>[1]\u00a0Just in the last several years, books in English, French and Farsi by Ervand Abrahamian, Gholam-Reza Afkhami, Mohammad Amini, Christopher de Bellaigue, Darioush Bayandor, Mark Gasiorowski (and this author), Stephen Kinzer, Abbas Milani, Ali Rahnema, and others have focused on, or at least dealt in depth with, Mosaddeq and the coup. They contain sometimes wide differences of view about who was behind planning for the overthrow and how it finally played out. More accounts are on the way (including an important English-language volume on Iranian domestic politics by Ali Rahnema of the American University of Paris).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[2]\u00a0Tim Weiner, \u201cC.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup,\u201d\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>, May 29, 1997.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[3]\u00a0Tim Weiner, \u201cC.I.A.\u2019s Openness Derided as a \u2018Snow Job\u2019,\u201d\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>, May 20, 1997; Tim Weiner,\u00a0op<\/em>.\u00a0cit<\/em>., May 29, 1997. (See also the link to the Archive\u2019s lawsuit, above.)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[4]\u00a0Kermit Roosevelt,\u00a0Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran<\/em>\u00a0(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979);\u00a0The New York Times<\/em>, April 16, 2000.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[5]\u00a0Precht recalls that he was originally not slated to be at the meetings, which usually deputy assistant secretaries and above attended. But the Near East division representative for State was unavailable. \u201cI was drafted,\u201d Precht said. Being forced to \u201csit through interminable and pointless talk\u201d about extraneous topics \u201cwhen my plate was already overflowing\u201d on Iran contributed to a \u201csour mood,\u201d he remembered. (Henry Precht e-mail to author, June 2, 2011.)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/a>[6]\u00a0Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, \u201c\u2018A Burden for the Department\u2019?: To The 1991\u00a0FRUS<\/em>\u00a0Statute,\u201d February 6, 2012,\u00a0http:\/\/history.state.gov\/frus150\/research\/to-the-1991-frus-statute<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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